Unfortunately, the city is a critical area of the Stockholm Agreement, which needs to put more emphasis on mediating agreements between the parties on de-escalation of hostilities and opening lasting humanitarian corridors to alleviate the suffering of Taz residents. The main positive achievement of the Stockholm agreement has been on the Hodeida front. The fighting in Hodeida has virtually ceased for almost a year, and the truce has more or less held for 13 months. This is due to the presence of the UN mission to support the hodeida agreement (UNMHA) in January 2019, whose mandate was renewed for a further six months on 13 January 2020. Although it has faced significant difficulties and is on its third leader, it is now fully occupied and has set up 4 „observation posts“ in the city of Hodeida, which help to maintain the area without combat and facilitate the transit of goods between the port and roads inland. The „re-deployment of forces“, which required the redistribution of troops from both sides and the surrender of the three ports to the local security forces, agreed by both sides and approved by the United Nations, was less successful. This formulation naturally allowed each party to interpret the situation as it had intended, and that is exactly what they did. The review of each part of the agreement suggests that international attention to findings of serious international crimes and human rights violations in Yemen played a role in influencing the parties` actions to accept the conditions and conditions to which they ultimately agreed in Sweden. We see the modest successes of the Stockholm Agreement in the fact that we are moving closer to achieving a lasting peace for all Yemenis. The process can be slow.
There will still be setbacks. But we will continue to promote and appreciate every small milestone on the road to supporting Yemenis in their quest for peace and stability. The parties committed to an immediate ceasefire in the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ras Issa, the redistribution of the armed forces, the securing of ports, the establishment of the joint coordination committee for redistribution under the UN presidency and the use of port revenues to support civil service salaries. The agreement also provided for a strengthening of the UN presence in the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ras Isa, which led to the creation of the UN support mission to the Hudaydah Agreement, through Security Council Resolution 2452 (2019) adopted on 16 January 2019. Under such a compromise, these territories would not be protected by pre-2014 forces (the government`s declared position) or by the forces there today (the implicit opinion of the Houthis). Instead, the UN could check the current local security forces to ensure that they are professional personnel and that their high-ranking commanders are in the military and security services before 2014. A limited agreement like this could be easier for both sides to accept, since it is a small part of the city`s security forces and a limited part of the city, making the UN review more feasible and avoiding the view that it is a comprehensive and final plan. The Houthis, who fear that a gap between implementation phases 1 and 2 could make ports vulnerable to attacks by forces that, after the first phase of redeployments, would still be north of the city, need assurances from the P5 that the implementation of the first phase would not encourage the government to pursue a military advantage. It may be easier to convince the Houthis, now that the UAE has partially withdrawn from the Red Sea coast.
With regard to the agreement between detainees and prisoners, we have worked extensively with the parties, with the ICRC, and we have offered our technical and logistical support.